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ARTICLE
CONGRESS MAIS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
SOMALIA: A CASE STUDY
Congressman Sam Gejdenson*
INTRODUCTION
Ironically, in a time of scarce resources to solve problems either at
home or abroad, neither the Executive nor Congress have found it easy
to reassess and reduce foreign aid as part of a systematic process of
integrating human rights concerns into United States foreign policy.'
When, in the case of an ally, human rights abuses escalate and political
and economic conditions deteriorate into anarchy, the U.S. often con-
tinues to operate on a business-as-usual schedule, often to the bitter
end of a long and painful regime.
The impetus for policy change frequently emanates from Congress.
* Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade, House Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States
House of Representatives. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable contribution of Helene
Kaufman, without whose assistance and insights this article could not have been
written.
1. See LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (1988) [hereinafter LAWYER'S
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT] (describing legislation which bars United
States security assistance to governments engaging in a "consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights" unless the Executive cites "ex-
traordinary circumstances" to justify assistance, "significant improvements" in the
country's behavior, and that refusal would adversely affect United States foreign pol-
icy); see also id. at 12 (stating that Congress generally hesitates to review funding
legislation that continues to provide aid to governments known to be engaged in human
rights violations); see also id. at 19 (discussing the minimal impact of legislative re-
strictions on aid to countries where human rights violations occur. See generally SEC.
OF STATE & SEC. OF TREASURY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO CON-
GRESS IN RESPONSE TO TITLE VII-HUMAN RIGHTS-OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT (PUBLIC LAW 950118, AS AMENDED) (reviewing procedures
that the United States follows when it provides aid to countries with records of human
rights violations).
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One example is the U.S. relationship with Somalia, where Congress
succeeded in effecting a change in U.S. foreign policy, despite initial
opposition by the Executive Branch. By blocking economic aid to
Somalia and by forcing the Executive Branch to acknowledge the
tragic human rights situation there, Congress successfully persuaded
the Executive Branch to integrate human rights concerns into the pol-
icy process, reassess U.S. foreign policy toward a particular country,
and scale back resources to a failing dictator.
I. BACKGROUND
Somalia was created when the British Somaliland Protectorate and
the United Nations Trusteeship territory of Somalia became indepen-
dent and merged on July 1, 1960.2 Somalia is located on the Horn of
Africa, bordering Ethiopia to the East and South. One of the least de-
veloped countries in the world, Somalia has a per capita annual income
of U.S. $280.' Some seventy-five percent of the country's approxi-
mately 5.8 million people are pastoral nomads.4 The majority of the
population of Somalia is divided into four main clans: the Darod,
Hawiye, Isaak, and Dir.5
General Siad Barre seized power in a bloodless coup in 1969 and
proceeded to replace the civilian government with a "scientific socialist
state."' 6 Barre suspended the constitution, dismantled the parliament
and the supreme court, and outlawed political parties.7 The new gov-
ernment established a close relationship with the Soviet Union and
viewed the United States as an imperialist enemy. 8 Somalia maintained
friendly relations with the Soviet Union for several years, until Ethio-
pia, with Soviet assistance, defeated Somalia in the Ogaden War.,
The Ogaden region of Ethiopia was, and continues to be, the subject
2. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SOMALIA, A LONG-TERM HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS 4(1988) [hereinafter SOMALIA HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS].
3. Id.
4. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES & INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, SCIENTISTS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOMALIA 8 (1988) [hereinafter SCIENTISTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS];
See generally, SOMALIA, A COUNTRY STUDY (H. Nelson ed. 1982) (containing essays
about Somalia's history, environment, economy, government, politics, and national
security).
5. SOMALIA HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS, supra note 2, at 4-5.
6. Keller, A New Direction for U.S.-Somalia Relations, THE WORLD AND I, Apr.
1989, at 129-39.
7. Id. at 129.
8. Id. at 130.
9. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE HORN OF AFRICA: A STRATEGIC
SURVEY 17-18 (1989) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, A STRATEGIC
SURVEY].
1088 [VOL. 5:1087
SOMALIA- A CASE STUDY
of intense hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia.10 The war with
Ethiopia originated from the long-held desire of Somalis to reunite the
historic territory of the Somali people."1 Fighting broke out in 1964
between the two countries, with Ethiopia supported by Kenya, and
Somalia supported by the Soviet Union. 2 In 1977, however, the Soviet
Union reversed its alliance with Somalia. 3 In March 1978, the Ethi-
opians, supplied and assisted by the Soviet Union and Cuba, defeated
Somalia.14
The United States has, since 1978, become Somalia's principal
ally.15 The United States considers Somalia to be of strategic impor-
tance due, in part, to its proximity to the Persian Gulfra and its air and
naval facilities at the Port of Berbera.27 The Soviet-built port and air
facilities at Berbera and the capital of Mogadishu are also considered
critical, especially as forward and rear deployment areas for operations
in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz."'
Under the leadership of General Barre Somalia has developed one of
the worst human rights records in the world. Additionally, the disaster
of the Ogaden War exacerbated clan rivalries."' While the Barre gov-
ernment crushed a significant coup attempt in 1978, opposition groups
have continued to fight against the regime and today represent a seri-
ous and growing challenge to General Barre.20 Given the relentless and
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Neier, Bloody Somalia, THE NATION, June 25, 1988, at 884-85.
16. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, A STRATEGIC SURVEY, supra note 9, at
54.
17. See Laitin, Security, Ideology, and Development on Africa's Horn, in AFRICA
IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND 204, 206 (R.I. Rotberg ed. 1988) (quoting Chester
Crocker, former Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs during the Reagan Adminis-
tration, who stated that access to military airfields and harbors was among the United
States' interests in the Horn of Africa); see also Keller, supra note 6, at 127, 130
(noting that United States-Somalia relations began in 1977 when the U.S. needed a
strategic presence in the Horn and that the United States uses the military and port
facilities at Berbera).
18. J. Rosati & P. Schraeder, The Tenuous U.S.-Somali Relationship 4-5 (1989)
(unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Rosati & Schraeder] (available in the offices of
The American University Journal of International Law and Policy). But see Keller,
supra note 6, at 132 (stating that the Berbera facilities never developed into a heavily
used or critical installation).
19. Keller, supra note 6, at 129.
20. Id. at 131. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), a group that sup-
porters of the 1978 coup formed in Ethiopia, and the Somali National Movement
(SNM), composed of members of the Isaak clan, are the predominant opposition
groups in Somalia. Id. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOAuA: OBSER-
VATIONS REGARDING THE NORTHERN CONFLICT AND RESULTING CONDITIONS 1-6
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ever-increasing litany of human rights abuses and General Barre's
alienation from the majority of the populace, most ahalysts believe that
his regime will soon fall.2
There are many causes for the chaos and anarchy that now envelop
Somalia. To understand the problems plaguing that country today it is
first necessary to understand the impact of Somali nationalism, the rad-
ical shifts in superpower politics on the Horn of Africa, and the persis-
tent pattern of gross human rights violations that have characterized
the Barre regime over the last twenty years.22 These elements contrib-
uted both to the United States' development of friendly relations with
Somalia, and the later efforts to withdraw U.S. support.
A. SOMALI NATIONALISM
Historic Somalia was divided by European colonizers into five terri-
tories: British and Italian Somaliland, Kenya, Djibouti, and part of
Ethiopia.23 Appeals to nationalism brought about the events that led to
independence, and the continuing desire to reunite all the peoples of
historic Somalia.24 Most notably, Somali independence heightened the
nationalistic fervor for claims to the Ogaden region, and led to the con-
(1989) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (discussing the Somali government's activities
against the Isaak clan and the subsequent formation and responses of the SNM); IN-
TERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, A STRATEGIC SURVEY, supra note 9, at 18 (noting
that the SSDF and SNM opposition to the Barre government originated in conflicts
arising from clan rivalries).
21. See INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, A STRATEGIC SURVEY, supra note 9,
at 19 (suggesting that a change in the Somalian government is imminent); Kaplan, The
Horn No Dilemma in a U.S. Blast at Somali Ruler, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1989, at
A15 (stating that the Barre regime is disintegrating quickly); Feldman, Somalia's
U.S.-Backed Regime is Weakening, Defector Says, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 4,
1989, at 7 (quoting a Somalian defector who suggested that a military coup was not far
off); See also To Save Somalia, The Times (London), Aug. 18, 1989, at 11 (noting
that the majority of Somalis are against Barre and that the only people in Barre's
confidence are his family members who hold the key governmental positions); Perlez,
Report for U.S. Says Somali Army Killed 5,000 Unarmed Civilians, N.Y. Times, Sep.
9, 1989, at 1, 5 (quoting a State Department official who described Somalia as in "a
state of disintegration" and further asserted that the government had lost much if its
influence over the country).
22. See infra notes 36-73 and accompanying text (discussing Somalia's human
rights record). See generally SOMALIA HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS, supra note 2 (detailing
Somalia's violations of human rights and presenting evidence about the Somalian gov-
ernment's brutal treatment and execution of political prisoners and its inequitable laws
governing the detention and trial of political prisoners); BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PRO-
GRAMS, WHY SOMALIS FLEE (1989) [hereinafter WHY SOMALIS FLEE] (presenting
Somalian refugee accounts of the Somalian government's treatment of citizens, includ-
ing descriptions of brutal torture, execution, rape, and other acts of violence).
23. Keller, supra note 6, at 127, 128.
24. Id.
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flicts with Ethiopia in an effort to repatriate the nearly two million So-
mali inhabitants of that region. 5 The Somali war on Ethiopia led to a
break up of the Somalia-Soviet alliance and paved the way for the
United States to play a greater role in political developments on the
Horn of Africa.
B. SUPERPOWER POLITICS IN AFRICA
After the break between Somalia and the Soviet Union, the United
States forged an alliance with Somalia in an attempt to counterbalance
the growing Soviet presence in other areas of the Horn." Ironically, the
United States-Somalia relationship started under the tutelage of the
Carter presidency,27 an administration heralded for its concern for
human rights. The United States Rapid Deployment Force was formed
at that time and resulted in Somalia's elevation to a strategic ally.',
The importance of an American presence in the Horn of Africa served
to justify the administration's involvement with Somalia, despite
Carter's hesitance to identify with Barre's human rights policies.2 It
was not until the Reagan Administration, however, that U.S.-Somali
relations became significant. Once again, the U.S. stressed the Cuban
threat as the justification for its backing of the Barre regime."0
U.S. academic experts have raised fundamental questions about the
necessity of maintaining access to the Berbera naval and air facilities in
northern Somalia.31 Originally acquired in response to the Soviet inva-
25. Id.
26. See Rosati & Schraeder, supra note 18, at 3-5 (providing a detailed account of
American strategic interests and military facilities in the Horn of Africa). The authors
state that the United States has three foreign policy goals in Somalia: containing So-
viet-Cuban advances by supporting United States allies in the region; acquiring mili-
tary outposts to strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean; and promoting private
enterprise and capitalist development. Id.
27. Keller, supra note 6, at 130.
28. Id.
29. Laitin, supra note 17, at 206.
30. Id. at 206-07; see also Campbell, Libya, Mercenaries Aiding U.S.-Supported
Somalia, Atlanta J. & Constitution, Oct. 6, 1988, at IA, 4A (noting that the Reagan
Administration wanted to continue its presence in Somalia in 1988 and that the United
States' primary interest there was the "strategic naval facility at Berbera").
31. See Summary: Congressional Roundtable Discussion on Reassessing United
States Policy Toward Somalia, Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion] (noting a United States official's
statement that the fighting in Somalia reduced the significance of United States mili-
tary access at Berbera). At the same time Somalia has turned to other countries for
military assistance. See Greenfield, Barre's Unholy Alliances, AFR. REP., Mar.-Apr.
1989, at 65, 67-68 (documenting President Siad Barre's efforts to obtain military sup-
port from Libya, South Africa, Egypt, and the role of white Rhodesian mercenaries in
the civil war).
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sion of Afghanistan, the eruption of the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the per-
ceived Soviet expansion in the northwest Indian Ocean, Berbera's cur-
rent strategic importance has drastically diminished.32 The cooling of
tensions on the Horn, coupled with a shift away from rigid anti-western
ideology in South Yemen and Ethiopia, help assure the U.S. of both
naval and air access to bases that permit the smooth operation of the
U.S. Central Command (the Rapid Deployment Force).33 As one au-
thor suggests, the U.S. has an opportunity to maximize its position on
the Horn of Africa because of the drastically diminishing Soviet pres-
ence in Ethiopia and should, consequently, sever its connection with the
notorious Barre regime.M
C. HUMAN RIGHTS
For years, Somalia has been well known for persistent and gross
human rights abuses. Documented accounts include attacks by the gov-
ernment on innocent refugee women and children.33 The State Depart-
ment has received frequent reports of such human rights abuses by So-
mali police as arbitrary arrest and detention without trial, and
summary trial by an untrained court.36 According to the State Depart-
32. See Keller, supra note 6, at 132 (arguing that the facility at Berbera never
became significant). The facility has less than twelve employees and serves mainly as a
storage facility. Id. United States officials refer to the base only as a "contingency"
facility. Id.
33. See Kaplan, supra note 21, at AI5 (pointing out that the Soviet-backed
Mengistu regime in Ethiopia began to look to the United States for aid as its position
weakened); see also Perlez, Ethiopia's President Looks Forward to Better U.S. Rela-
tions, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1988, at Al (quoting Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile
who said he looked forward to improved relations between the United States and Ethio-
pia during the Bush administration).
34. Kaplan, supra note 21, at A15. See also Bukalov, Somalia: The Heirs of Punt,
NEw TIMES (Moscow), Feb. 28-Mar. 6, 1989, at 16 (quoting Ahmed Mohamed Adan,
the Secretary of the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who said that "Soviet-Somali
relations are still far from exhausted").
35. See, e.g., WHY SOMALIS FLEE, supra note 22, at 21 (reporting that women and
children comprised 41 % of the victims of 26 Somalian army attacks on civilian
villages).
36. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES FOR 1986 267-69 (1987) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1986]. See also
Campbell, Somalia Attacks Confirmed, Atlanta J. & Constitution, Nov. 2, 1988, at
1A (discussing Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Refugee Assistance Kenneth
Bleakley's reports of civilian bombings in Somalia). Colin Campbell of the Atlanta
Journal & Constitution has written several articles detailing the Somalian govern-
ment's disregard for human rights. See Campbell, supra note 31, at IA (noting politi-
cal instability in Somalia, shipments of weapons to the Somalian government, and re-
porting the Somalian government's murder and other abusive tactics); see also
Campbell, Somalia: An Old Story for U.S., Atlanta J. & Constitution, Oct. 22, 1988,
at IA (describing the Barre regime, detailing an interview with Siad Barre, and dis-
cussing the reports of organizations about the Somalian government's human rights
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ment's 1987 report on human rights practices, recurring credible re-
ports "indicate that methods of torture include submersion in water,
electric shock, placing prisoners in contorted positions for extended pe-
riods, severe beating[s], wounding with knives, and rape."37 Moreover,
the government also severely constricts civil liberties.3
Other organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch and the Law-
yers Committee for Human Rights, are more vehement in their criti-
cism of the regime's dismal human rights record. In a joint critique of
the above State Department document, they report that a pro-govern-
ment bias leads the State Department to distort facts and to omit a
discussion of vital issues.39
While human rights groups report frequent and continuing human
rights abuses, the government of Somalia continues to deny the litany
of documented reports of brutal human rights violations. Mahomed A.
Mahomed, speaking for the Somali Embassy in the United States,
maintains that Somalia has "a good human rights record, which we are
very proud of, and invite anyone who wants proof of that to visit
Somalia anytime and see for himself."'40 These protestations are repeat-
edly countered by human rights groups, such as Amnesty International
in its 1988 report.4"
violations); Campbell, Somali Attacks Confirmed, supra (detailing a State department
official's statement about Somalian human rights violations); Campbell, Famine's Hor-
ror Driven Home, Atlanta J. & Constitution, Nov. 11, 1988, at IA (recounting a con-
gressional fact finding mission to the Horn of Africa that brought back details of wide-
spread starvation and noting Congress' increased interest in Somalia). Colin Campbell
was one of the few journalists who was able to enter Somalia since fighting broke out in
May 1988. Editor's Note, Atlanta J. & Constitution, Oct. 6, 1988, at 4A.
37. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAc-
TICES FOR 1987, at 310 (1988).
38. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
39. 1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1988 (1989) [hereinafter
REAGAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD]; see also SCIENTISTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Supra
note 4, at xi (stating that the purpose of the group's visit was to obtain information and
publicize the plight of 11 imprisoned scientific colleagues). The work of the National
Academy's Committee on Human Rights proved extremely influential in bringing the
human side of the story to the Congress. This was particularly important as members
became involved wilh the fate of the individual political prisoners, especially those who
had spent time in the U.S. The many and repeated letters that were sent from various
congressional offices on behalf of individuals heightened the concern about human
rights abuses as the problem escalated during the civil conflict in the north. In addition,
the Somali government committed a serious blunder when it sent a letter that later
proved false to key Congressmen on various foreign affairs and appropriations commit-
tees' stating that certain political prisoners had been released. Many prisoners were
released, but not until weeks after the letter was sent.
40. Lembede, Rights Groups Ask Halt in Somali Aid, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1988,
at A34.
41. See SOMALIA HUMAN RIGrrs CRISIS, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that human
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Amnesty International concluded that violations have persisted since
the Barre regime took power, and that human rights abuses have in-
creased in the 1980s.42 Amnesty International reports cover all aspects
of the legal system, documenting a stunning number of arbitrary ar-
rests and detainments as well as the horrendous and systematic torture
of political prisoners.43 Somali Law No. 54 of 1970 prescribes a
mandatory death penalty for "exploiting religion, for creating national
disunity or subverting or weakening state authority."" A special court
system, with almost no basic safeguards, hears all security cases.4 For
years, military police tracked and incarcerated potential dissidents and
other innocent bystanders,46 and documented reports exist of physical
abuse of those incarcerated.47
Human rights conditions deteriorated drastically in May 1988 when
a civil conflict erupted. 48 After a rapprochement between Somalia and
Ethiopia in the early months of 1988, the Somali National Movement
(SNM) was no longer welcomed in Ethiopia .' The SNM is closely tied
to the northern Isaak clan, which is the largest minority group in
Somalia and has faced considerable discrimination by the Somali gov-
ernment for the last two decades.8 0 On May 27, 1988, SNM units re-
turned to northern Somalia and stormed the town of Burao, assassinat-
ing a local commander and several government officers. 1 The SNM
also attacked Hargeisa, Somalia's second largest city, near the end of
May 1988.52
The government forces responded with savage, indiscriminate slaugh-
ter.5 3 Hundreds of civilians were killed." Hundreds were jailed, many
rights abuses have taken place in Somalia for over 20 years).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2-4, 7-12, 33-45.
44. Id. at 23.
45. Id. at 22.
46. Id. at 14-15.
47. WHY SOMALIS FLEE, supra note 22, at 61; see also Reported Massacres and
Indiscriminate Killings in Somalia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Aryeh Neier, Vice Chairman, Human Rights Watch) (stating that pris-
oners were tortured in order to obtain confessions for anti-government activities).
48. Burkhalter, Somalia's Massacres Aren't on TV, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1989, at
23.
49. Not a Nice Way to Come Home, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1988, at 48-49.
50. Burkhalter, supra note 48, at 23. See also Hearings, supra note 47, at 7-25
(statement of Aryeh Neier, Vice Chairman Human Rights Watch) (documenting the
downward trend in human rights violations in Somalia).
51. 134 CONG. REC. E2849 (daily ed. Sep. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Gejdenson).
52. Not a Nice Way to Come Home, supra note 49, at 48.
53. Burkhalter, supra note 48, at 23.
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without being charged.5 5 The rural economy was destroyed as govern-
ment forces killed livestock, poisoned wells, and engaged in extensive
artillery bombardments.56 Expatriates leaving the area of Hargeisa told
of massacres, summary executions, and indiscriminate killings of civil-
ians.5 The State Department's Bureau of Refugee Programs, con-
tracting a study of human rights issues during this and the subsequent
eleven month period, reported that the Somali army engaged in system-
atic assaults on unarmed civilians in the northern part of the country,
leaving more than 5,000 dead.5 " The report, endorsed by the State De-
partment, left no doubt that the Barre regime was using brutal force
against unarmed civilian noncombatants in retaliation against the
SNM.5 9 The report also documented, through interviews with eyewit-
nesses, government methods of torturing and sometimes killing civilian
prisoners.
In early 1989, in response to international pressure, several hundred
prisoners were released from jail-including some of the long-term po-
litical detainees.6 0 By July 1989, however, renewed violence broke
out. 1 Troops in the capital fired on demonstrating Muslims protesting
the assassination of Bishop Salvatore Colombo, the Vatican's represen-
tative in Somalia. 2 At least 450 people were killed, 1,000 injured, and
2,000 arrested in the first few days.6 3 On July 16, a group of Isaak men
were massacred.6 The New York Times quoted a State Department
official who described Somalia as being in a state of "disintegration." '
The official reported that the government had lost control of most of
the country, that clan rivalry had taken the upper hand, and that
54. WHY SohiLis FLEE, supra note 22, at 60. See also Henry, A Massacre in
Somalia Shifts U.S. Policy, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1990, at A21 (stating that thousands
were killed in the city of Hargeisa in 1988).
55. Burkhalter, supra note 48, at 23.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. WHY SOMALIS FLEE, supra note 22, at 61. See also GAO REPORT, supra note
20, at 6-7 (detailing the vast destruction in the city of Hargeisa).
59. WHY SOMALiS FLEE, supra note 22, at 61. The report went on to assert that
"the Somali Armed Forces appears to have engaged in a widespread, systematic and
extremely violent assault on the unarmed civilian Isaak population ... when neither
resistance to these actions nor danger to the Somali Armed Forces was present". Id. at
60.
60. See Burkhalter, supra note 48, at 23 (giving a concise analysis of how Congress
intervened and effectively forced the Somali government to take some limited actions
with respect to human rights and the release of some political prisoners).
61. Henry, supra note 54, at A24.
62. Somalia Executes 46 after Rioting, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1989, at A4.
63. Id.
64. Perlez, supra note 21, at A5.
65. Id.
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"[i]t's a situation of everyone for themselves."6
As a result of the civil war in the north, more than 300,000 Somalis
have walked across the border into Ethiopia. 7 One barometer of the
seriousness of the plight of the civilians in the north is that they chose
to take refuge in Ethiopia, a country racked by its own internal drought
and bloodshed. 68 Food, water, shelter, and medicine are all inadequate
in the refugee camps run by the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) in this desolate corner of Ethiopia.6 9 Even under
these harsh conditions, the refugees report that they are unwilling to
return to Somalia under current circumstances.70 Another estimated
one million or more people have been reported to have been displaced
in Somalia.7 1 Reconstruction of the north cannot seriously be contem-
plated without some form of political settlement.
II. THE U.S. EXECUTIVE'S RESPONSE-BUSINESS AS
USUAL
U.S. foreign policy toward Somalia has uniformly ignored the insti-
tutionalized nature of human rights violations by the Siad Barre re-
gime. Even with the litany of abuses documented in the north during
the civil war in May 1988,72 the Reagan Administration operated on a
program of business as usual. The Administration repeatedly pressed
the Congress to release more economic aid in the face of mounting evi-
dence of a persistent pattern of gross human rights violations. For ex-
ample, at the height of the civil conflict in 1988, the Administration
consciously decided to send U.S. rifles and ammunition directly into the
north; not surprisingly, they were used by the government against its
66. Id.
67. Id. Statistics on the exact number of Somalis who have become refugees in
Ethiopia vary. A conservative estimate is 300,000. See Lembede, supra note 40, at A34
(stating that 400,000 refugees have fled to Ethiopia); ROUNDTABLE DiscussION, supra
note 31, at 4 (stating that 350,000 Somalis fled from Somalia to Ethiopia); GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 20, at 2 (stating that 350,000 Isaaks have fled to Ethiopia while
others have fled to other countries); WHY SOMALiS FLEE, supra note 22, at 1 (estimat-
ing that 300,000-500,000 refugees have fled to Ethiopia).
68. Perlez, supra note 21, at A5.
69. Statement of Stephen Morrison, Staff Member, Subcommittee on Africa of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee (Nov. 1988).
70. WHY SOMALIS FLEE, supra note 22, at 65.
71. Ismail Hurreh, member of the Central Committee of the Somali National
Movement, Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa Meeting, March 1989. The Gov-
ernment of Somalia reported that there are about one million displaced persons in
Somalia, although the composition of the displaced remains unsubstantiated by any
fully reliable source.
72. See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text (describing the war torn north
and the abusive policies of the Barre regime).
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own citizens.7 3 U.S. military communications assistance also proved
helpful in boosting Somalia's combat support in the civil war against
the people of the north.7 4
The dramatic deterioration of the political and economic situation in
Somalia further undermined human rights practices in Somalia and ex-
panded the affiliation of the victims to other clans beyond the Isaak .7
The Administration, however, refused to act. In another example, the
Administration knowingly continued to permit the Somali armed forces
to distribute U.S. food donations with complete disregard for the legal
restrictions on providing food to armed refugees.70 The U.S. responded
to the conffict by requesting more bilateral economic aid from Con-
gress, not less.7 7 In the multilateral donor community, the Administra-
tion encouraged the convocation of a "support group" of international
donors to obtain millions in aid to repay the Somali government's inter-
est arrearages to the International Monetary Fund, thereby sustaining
a failing dictator who had alienated his population through indiscrimi-
nate slaughter. 8
Within one week of the July 1989 massacres, the State Department
asked for permission from Congress to provide $20 million to the Barre
regime.7 9 Time and time again, both the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions continued to press for more aid to Somalia. 0 Although the
amount of actual aid provided to Siad Barre never reached the levels
promised by the Reagan Administration, the amount of aid was ex-
73. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 7-9.
74. See Campbell, supra note 30, at 4A (describing the assistance provided by
United States military personnel to repair Somali government military communications
facilities).
75. See Feldman, Somalia's US-Backed Leader Shaken, Christian Sci. Monitor,
June 28, 1989, at 8 (noting that most clans are unhappy with the Barre regime); see
also Doing it the Army Way in Africa's Horn, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 24,
1989, at 32, 37 (noting that from a regional perspective, reduction in aid and the shift
in superpower policies and alliances are causing major political problems for military
leaders on the Horn).
76. See U.N. Withholds Aid in Somalia Dispute, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1989, at
A4 (noting that the United Nations is withholding food aid from Ethiopian refugees in
Somalia because of Somalia's use of these people for military operations).
77. See INTERFAITH FOUNDATION & INTERFAITH ACTION FOR EcoNoMIc JUSTICE,
U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18, table 6 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter INTERFAITH] (establishing that military and economic aid go hand in hand in the
allocation of U.S. aid resources).
78. A meeting between House Foreign Affairs congressional staff and Treasury De-
partment officials in August 1989 confirmed that the Administration was still seeking
resources to help repay Somalia's interest arrearages and to meet prior expectations to
complement Italian and other donor aid for such purpose.
79. Burkhalter, supra note 48, at 23.
80. See Henry, supra note 54, at A21 (noting that the United States has been the
primary supplier of economic and military assistance to Somalia since 1978).
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tremely high, relative to other countries-especially for parts of the Af-
rican continent. Somalia received over 25 percent of all U.S. economic
support funds for Africa (excluding Egypt). 81 This percentage is even
more impressive when one considers that the entire African continent
has a population of 630 million people compared to Somalia's esti-
mated population of 5.8 million.82 The Administration justified the high
aid levels to Somalia relative to other countries by citing Somalia's
strategic geographic placement and the importance of contingency U.S.
military facilities there.8"
The State Department has almost no institutional mechanisms for
integrating human rights concerns into U.S. foreign policy formulation
and even fewer means of reassessing and modifying existing U.S. policy
when human rights abuses attain crisis proportions. Strengthening ex-
ecutive leadership in human rights is thus more important than imple-
menting bureaucratic or systems improvements. If the Administration
places limited emphasis on human rights, no bureaucratic tinkering can
remedy the absence of a "kinder, gentler" 84 advocate at the top of the
81. See INTERFAITH, supra note 77, at 12 (listing Somalia among the 20 countries
that received the most aid in 1988). In general, the United States provides economic
support funds to countries that it recognizes as having particular economic, political, or
security significance. Id. at 8. Economic support funds are generally provided in the
form of cash transfers, import programs, or projects. Id. The United States government
provided $25 million in economic support funding to Somalia in 1988. Id. at 120. In
contrast, Egypt received $820 million. Id. The United States provides economic support
funds to nine African countries. Id. at 140.
82. See SCIENTISTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4 (confirming that Somalia
has a population of approximately 5.8 million); See also THE POPULATION INSTITUTE,
TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (1988) (stating that Africa's 1988 population was 630
million and that it grows 3.1% annually).
83. See Pytte, The Horn of Africa: Congress is Using Aid as a Lever to Protest
Rights Abuses, 47 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1132 (1989) (stating that the Reagan
Administration wanted to continue military assistance to Somalia to maintain the
United States' position in the Horn of Africa). In comparison, some economists and
policy makers argue that the Somali government's economic reform program justifies
the high level of aid funding from both bilateral and multilateral sources. See, e.g.,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, SOMALIA PROGRAM ASSISTANCE AP-
PROVAL DOCUMENT (1988) (stating that the United States Agency for International
Development's justification for approving $21 million in aid to Somalia in 1988 was to
assist the country in building a resource base to enable it to sustain long-term economic
development). Others suggest, however, that United States aid contributes to Somalia's
poor economic condition. See Food Aid Undermining Grain Production in Somalia,
WORLD BANK NEWS, Mar. 10, 1988, at 3 (suggesting that food aid to Somalia has
encouraged Somalia's economic decline by forcing food prices down and giving
Somalian farmers little incentive to produce food). The General Accounting Office also
criticized the food aid program to Somalia, but said it was unsuccessful because food
did not reach intended beneficiaries. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FAMINE IN AF-
RICA, IMPROVING EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF PROGRAMS 16 (1986).
84. See Bush Accepts Nomination, Vows to Fulfill Reagan 'Mission'; Candidate
Pledges to Create Jobs, Work for Peace, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1988, at Al (reporting
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government.
When human rights considerations are not integrated into the United
States' budget and policy deliberations, policy tends to remain undis-
turbed-even in the face of dramatic deteriorations in human rights
practices. In the case of Somalia, it appears that the Executive Branch
had collected information on serious human rights violations by the So-
mali military but chose to ignore the facts when faced with important
budgetary decisions.81
Human rights is the functional responsibility of the Bureau of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA). 88 The BHRHA
produces Annual Country Reports on the human rights situation in for-
eign countries.8 7 The BHRHA Annual Country Reports, applauded for
their insightful and generally objective country reporting, from the
outside appear to have an inadequate impact on integrating human
rights concerns into foreign policy and foreign aid determinations. Al-
though the State Department issues the Annual Country Reports, these
reports are seldom used in policy deliberations or in resource allocation
and other budgeting procedures. 88
United States ambassadors sometimes seem to view their role as in-
terpreters and defenders of their host countries. In Somalia, the United
States Ambassador maintained the appearance of defending the regime
to Congress in the face of accumulating evidence of President Siad
Barre's personal knowledge of the massacres.8 9
candidate George Bush's speech accepting the Republican Party's presidential nomina-
tion, in which he stated his desire for "a kinder, gentler nation").
85. See REAGAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 39, at 233 (asserting that
the United States delivered military assistance to Somalia when it possessed incontro-
vertible evidence that the Somali government continued to perpetrate widespread
human rights abuses). The Executive Branch has exhibited no intention of linking mili-
tary and economic determinations to the protection of human rights. Id.
86. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 4
(stating that Congress established the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs (BHRHA) in 1976 to ensure that human rights concerns are treated systemati-
cally and analyzing the human rights responsibilities of the Executive Branch and
Congress).
87. See id. at 4 (asserting that the BHRHA remains unable to incorporate human
rights issues into United States foreign policy and claiming that the BHRHA lacks the
institutional structure for consistently addressing human rights issues at a sufficiently
high level).
88. See id. at 5-7 (arguing that although the Annual Country Reports expose
human rights violations, the State Department fails to formulate country-specific pro-
grams for improving human rights).
89. See REAGAN'S HUMIAN RIGHTs RECORD, supra note 39, at 238 (noting that
United States Ambassador Crigler, who became Ambassador to Somalia in 1987, does
not manifest much concern over the Somali human rights situation). The United States
Embassy in Somalia does not protect victims of human rights abuses, confront mem-
bers of the opposition, nor provide the United States with information on the human
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The Treasury Department has unequivocally relinquished the human
rights function to the State Department, yet it continues to argue for
its primary institutional responsibility for World Bank and other inter-
national lending functions. The Treasury Department has yet to even
seriously question a World Bank loan to Somalia or reassess its justifi-
cation for disbursing millions of dollars in program lending within one
month of the July 1989 massacres."
The Defense Department does not seem to distinguish between send-
ing military assistance for legitimate security functions and granting
military aid for use against civilian populations. The unclassified Gen-
eral Accounting Office report of U.S. military aid, initiated because of
congressional human rights concerns, thoroughly documented the lim-
ited importance of human rights in making the decision to ship aid
during the civil war.91 Administration officials do not appear concerned
that United States military assistance to Somalia was never intended
for the maiming and killing of Somali civilians.
Ironically, the Executive Branch has, by default, relegated the
human rights monitoring function to the United States Congress,9 2 yet
chastises both the House of Representatives and the Senate for
micromanagement and unnecessary earmarks. Even in the face of con-
certed Executive Branch opposition, however, Congress may succeed in
formulating a sound, moral, and completely acceptable U.S. foreign
policy.
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY TOWARD SOMALIA
Given Somalia's remarkable record of human rights abuses, the lack
of Executive Branch initiative to limit foreign aid is inexplicable.93 Not
rights situation). Id.
90. See Burkhalter, supra note 48, at 23 (noting that the World Bank approved a
$70 million package in July 1989 and the State Department requested $20 million for
Barre's regime).
91. See GAO REPORT, supra note 20 (reporting the results of interviews with So-
mali refugees in Ethiopia and their accounts of human rights violations during May
and June 1988).
92. See LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 5
(affirming that the Executive Branch lacks an official mechanism for integrating
human rights concerns into its own decision-making process). Since there is no formal
structure for addressing human rights concerns within the executive departments, the
Executive Branch relies excessively on the BHRHA for the formulation of United
States human rights policy). Id.
93. See Rosati & Schraeder, supra note 18, at 2 (commenting that the United
States continued to assist the radical governments in power in Nicaragua, the Philip-
pines, and Haiti as a result of the United States' reactive foreign policy and lack of
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until Congress began to take an active role in shaping foreign policy
toward Somalia did a shift in economic aid practices begin. Congress
was successful in changing U.S. aid practices, in part, because deter-
mined Congressmen from a variety of Committees became personally
involved and fought for the release of accurate and objective informa-
tion on the intolerable human rights situation in Somalia.
During 1988 and 1989, Congress initiated a series of actions that
changed the course of U.S. policy toward Somalia. Many in Congress
questioned the Reagan Administration's policy of continuing to provide
economic and military aid to Somalia even at the height of the civil
conflict in that country. In July 1988, the Africa Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on human rights
in Somalia. 4 This was the first in a series of human rights hearings,
briefings, conferences, and other congressional actions by members of
Committees and Subcommittees on Banking, Appropriations, the
Human Rights Caucus, and the Select Committee on Hunger, among
others.
In September 1988, in a letter to then Secretary of State George
Shultz, a group of Congressmen wrote: "First and foremost, we need a
thorough human rights report done by an objective professional, using
interviews with the refugees that would provide some indication of the
seriousness of the human rights situation in Somalia." 95 The Congress-
men recommended that the State Department suspend economic and
policy-making foresight).
94. See generally Hearings, supra note 47, (presenting the testimony of representa-
tives from Human Rights Watch, the African Affairs section of the State Department,
and a former Agency for International Development contractor in Somalia). Since
1987, Congress has required the Executive Branch to inform the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees before disbursing assistance to Somalia. Pytte, supra note
83, at 1133. While concern about the situation in Somalia was evident prior to the
hearings themselves, the testimony of the administration and outside experts galvanized
opposition to Somali assistance in the House and led to a series of congressional letters
to Secretary of State George Shultz and later Secretary of State James Baker. See
infra notes 95-96, 113 and accompanying text (discussing the letters sent to Secretaries
of State Shultz and Baker). The hearing also generated General Accounting Office
reports on Somalia. See GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 1 (stating that the GAO
Report was in response to congressional requests). Nevertheless, the congressional
hearing raised more questions than it answered.
95. Letter from Thirty Congressmen to Secretary of State George P. Shultz (Sept.
8, 1988) [hereinafter Congressional Letter] (requesting the State Department to issue
a report reevaluating United States foreign policy in Somalia). The letter highlighted
the grim human rights abuses by the Somali military, the inadequacy of the care for
Somali refugees in Ethiopia, and the use of United States military procurement against
the civilian population. Id. at 2. Unfortunately, the State Department did not agree to
the recommendations and continued to press for aid. See supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text (presenting State Department requests for more assistance to Somalia in
1989).
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military assistance to Somalia until a thorough reassessment of United
States foreign policy was completed in light of the alleged human
rights abuses.9"
In November 1988, a congressional seminar was held to reassess
United States policy toward Somalia. 97 During that seminar, over one
hundred congressional staff and outside experts, including staff mem-
bers of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and House Committee on
Appropriations, raised further questions about the validity of United
States foreign policy on the Horn, particularly in Somalia. They voiced
concern that United States strategic interests in Somalia were at risk
given the lengthy conflict in the north and the unstable political cli-
mate.9" Others suggested that our strategic interests needed to be reas-
sessed in view of dramatic transformations in Somalia's military and
political conditions.99 Participants in the seminar also urged that
United States policy should focus on promoting human rights and polit-
ical stabilization, because these would ultimately further United States
strategic interests. 100 Some argued that strategic interests should in-
clude not only access to military facilities, but also political and eco-
nomic stability.101 Finally, others commented that even if the Executive
Branch continues to define strategic interests solely in military terms,
the value of foreign military facilities is directly linked to a stable polit-
ical and economic environment. 10 2
During 1988, the House and Senate put a joint moratorium on
United States assistance to Somalia.0' Subsequently, the House Sub-
96. See Congressional Letter, supra note 95 (advising the State Department to sus-
pend aid to Somalia until it issues a report evaluating human rights abuses and allows
international relief agencies to enter Somalia to assist all victims).
97. See generally ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION, supra note 31 (summarizing the con-
gressional conference); see also Gejdenson, Leland, Wolpe Sponsor Nov. 15 Confer-
ence on Somalia, News from Sam Gejdenson, Media Advisory (Nov. 10, 1988) (an-
nouncing the agenda for the congressional seminar). The Foreign Affairs Committee
summary of the Roundtable Discussion includes the names, affiliations, and telephone
numbers of the participants. Notably, the State Department and the Department of
Defense steadfastly refused to participate in the seminar. J. Kramer, The U.S. in
Somalia: Applying the Trickle-Down Theory to Human Rights and Foreign Policy 12
(Dec. 12, 1988) (unpublished paper for Professor D. Abernathy at Stanford Univer-
sity) [hereinafter The Trickle-Down Theory to Human Rights] (stating that no State
Department officials attended the congressional seminar). See Congressional Letter,
supra note 95, at 3 (criticizing United States foreign policy in Somalia for being too
ambiguous and in need of reassessment).
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. ROUNDTABLE DIscussION, supra note 31, at 2; Keller, supra note 6, at 127,
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committee on Africa presented a compromise on funding that would
disburse part of the aid from fiscal year 1987 and withhold the remain-
der of the funds until the Somali human rights situation improved."°
In April 1989, Congress allocated additional fiscal year 1987 funds in
response to the release of over two hundred political prisoners in early
1989.105 The funds, however, were never sent to Somalia. Additionally,
Congress decided to maintain the moratorium on 1988 and 1989 eco-
nomic and military aid until the human rights situation further im-
proved.10 Congress, thus successfully halted the delivery of United
States Economic Support Funds to Somalia despite repeated requests
from the Executive Branch. Indeed, as late as August 1989, in a meet-
ing with congressional aides, Treasury Department officials were still
bemoaning the lack of United States funding to repay the Somali gov-
ernment's interest arrearages to the International Monetary Fund. 107
Meetings with Somali officials and the Administration prompted fur-
ther re-examination of the role of the United States in Somalia's civil
conflict. For example, the Somali prime minister visited with Congress
and further undermined the Somali government's position by implying
to the Congressmen present that his government had not received Lib-
yan arms. In fact, the State Department had already substantiated al-
legations that Somalia had received arms from Libya.108
132 (reporting that Congress began withholding over $55 million in economic aid to
Somalia in the summer of 1988); The Trickle-Down Theory to Human Rights, supra
note 97, at 11 (asserting that the House and Senate withheld approximately S60 mil-
lion in economic aid to Somalia in 1988).
104. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION, supra note 31, at 2; see also Lembede, supra note
40, at A34 (reporting that the United States delivered $42.5 million in economic aid to
Somalia in fiscal year 1988, including $6.5 million in military assistance).
105. Pytte, supra note 83, at 1133 (reporting that Congress disbursed $15 million
of fiscal year 1987 funds because of human rights improvements).
106. Id. (stating that the House Appropriations Committee decided in April 1989
to continue withholding $36 million in economic assistance from fiscal years 1988 and
1989 in addition to withholding $2.5 million in military funds from fiscal year 1989).
107. Meeting of officials of the Treasury Department with congressional staff mem-
bers from the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Banking Committee.
Treasury Department officials informed those present that the $15 million "compro-
mise" funding for the IMF interest arrearages had never been paid. These funds were
meant to complement the resources the Italian government committed to help the gov-
ernment of Somalia repay its interest arrearages to the IMF. Even if the $15 million
had been released, it is unclear how the needed total resources for the IMF interest
arrearages would have been paid, since no additional resources would have been availa-
ble. See also INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, A STRATEGIC SURVEY, supra note
9, at 30 (reporting that Somalia's debt service is over $150 million per year and that
Somalia needed approximately $70 million in debt relief per year in 1987 and 1988).
108. See also REAGAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 39, at 234 (citing
reports that Libya delivered at least two planeloads of weapons to the Somali govern-
ment in September 1988 and a shipment of lethal nerve gas in October 1988).
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Finally, in August 1989, a year after Congress requested a study on
the human rights situation in Somalia by an independent consultant,
the State Department issued a report synthesizing the results of 252
interviews with Somali refugees."0 9 The document confirmed the shock-
ing human rights violations that Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, and the National Academy of Sciences, among others, had re-
ported. 110 With its endorsement of the report, and faced with mounting
evidence of deterioration in-the human rights, economic, and political
situation, the State Department reversed its former position. It allo-
cated elsewhere the major bilateral economic support funds designated
for Somalia,"' and halted military aid." 2
In November 1989, all of the eight Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
Chairmen, along with thirty-nine other Congressmen, sent a letter to
Secretary of State James Baker commending him for his decision to
reassess United States policy toward Somalia."13 The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees also halted its food aid program for
refugees in the northern part of Somalia." 4 The African Development
Bank reportedly suspended its program as well." 5 Unfortunately, the
World Bank has continued to provide some aid, although after disburs-
ing the first tranche, the second tranche of the major World Bank loan
has been on hold. The United States, even under mounting pressure
from Congress, has yet to argue for a reexamination of the World Bank
109. See WHY SOMALIS FLEE, supra note 22, at 2 (assessing the reports of Somali
refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya, and Somali and Ethiopian refugees living in northern
Somalia).
110, Letter from 47 Congressmen to Secretary of State James A. Baker, III (Nov.
29, 1989) [hereinafter Letter to Secretary Baker]; see generally WHY SOMALIS FLEE,
supra note 22 (analyzing refugee testimony of systematic and random killings of
civilians).
111. See Henry, supra note 54, at A24 (stating that the Administration has dis-
tanced itself from Somalia and that the United States embassy staff was cut by over
one-half).
112. Kaplan, supra note 33, at A15.
113. See Letter to Secretary Baker, supra note 110 (congratulating the Secretary
of State for sponsoring and endorsing the State Department Report, Why Somalis
Flee). The letter supports Secretary Baker's decision to reassign large bilateral eco-
nomic support funds and to cease United States military assistance to Somalia. Id. The
Congressmen expressed their belief that the Secretary of State's decision "is a sound
one and reflects the only tenable option given the existing circumstances." Id.
114. See U.N. Withholds Aid in Somalia Dispute, supra note 76, at 4 (explaining
that the United Nations is withholding assistance to Somalia because the Somali gov-
ernment is misusing relief funds for military purposes); REAGAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS
RECORD, supra note 39, at 237 (announcing that the UNHCR took the unprecedented
step of deciding to eliminate its assistance to Ethiopian refugees in Somalia by the
summer of 1990).
115. Unofficial telephone communication with African Development Bank officer,
September 1989.
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lending portfolio. 18 United States policy with respect to bilateral and
multilateral lending to Somalia appears to have been inconsistent at
best, duplicitous at worst.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The process by which human rights concerns are integrated into
United States foreign policy within the Executive Branch must be sub-
stantially revised. For example, the Inter-Agency Group on Human
Rights and Foreign Assistance (Inter-Agency Group) must be revital-
ized and restructured.1 17 For eight years, the Reagan Administration
made a mockery of the entire process by rendering the Inter-Agency
Group powerless to accomplish its stated mandate."" The Inter-Agency
Group has no power unless the State Department itself explicitly grants
it, and many Agency representatives have ceased to participate en-
tirely.119 The Inter-Agency Group should publish a "watch list" of
countries that the United States considers serious violators of human
rights, which would subject those nations to restrictions under the 1975
Harkin Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.120 The
Amendment states that countries that systematically violate human
rights may not receive aid unless "such assistance will directly benefit
the needy people in such country."' 121 Congress established identical
limits on foreign assistance in the Food for Peace Program in 1977 and
the Economic Support Funds provision of the Foreign Assistance
116. Meeting with Treasury Department officials, August 1989. In fact, the Ad-
ministration has indicated that human rights violations need not affect United States
policy with respect to multilateral lending that focuses on needy people.
117. See LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 5
(noting that the Carter Administration created the Inter-Agency Group to coordinate
United States human rights policy among the numerous government departments that
administer programs affecting human rights).
118. See id. at 5 (asserting that the Inter-Agency Group lost its effectiveness after
President Carter left office).
119. See id. (stipulating that currently only the State and Treasury Departments
and the Agency for International Development participate in the Inter-Agency Group,
whereas initially the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor and
the National Security Council participated in the Group as well). The absence of rele-
vant executive departments and agencies and the junior position of the Executive
Branch officials that do participate prevent the Inter-Agency Group from achieving its
policy-making objectives. Id.
120. See Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1988) (providing that the
United States may not grant aid to countries which consistently violate internationally
recognized human rights practices); LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that Congress restricted aid to countries engaging in
gross human rights violations in the Foreign Assistance Act's amendment commonly
known as the Harkin Amendment).
121. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1988).
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Act.'22 These limits have been ineffective, however, because the Ad-
ministration has defined almost every aid project as directly benefitting
the needy. If the Executive Branch believes that no countries have a
"consistent pattern of gross" human rights violations, 23 it has no basis
for halting or even re-examining U.S. policy on bilateral or multilateral
aid. It is no accident that the responsibility for human rights has fallen
squarely on the Legislative Branch, because the Executive Branch has
effectively abrogated its responsibility to make human rights decisions.
Insiders suggest that the Bush Administration has no interest in
strengthening the human rights interagency process, especially with re-
spect to decisions on U.S. assistance levels.
Everyone argues that foreign aid is scarce; Americans are told there
is no money for worthwhile projects at home. Congress has successfully
demonstrated to the Administration that aid should be provided only
when it can be used responsibly. Somalia is one instance where Con-
gress has exercised moral leadership and protected long-term U.S. in-
terests in the Horn of Africa. Now, Congress and the Administration
need to work together to assure that World Bank lending conforms to
the same criteria for responsible program spending as U.S. bilateral
aid.
The Administration's reluctance to reassess U.S. policy toward
Somalia provides a sobering lesson for those concerned about a "kinder,
gentler" U.S. foreign policy. Both the interagency human rights review
process and the human rights systems within agencies such as the De-
partments of Commerce and Defense require reinforcement if human
rights concerns are to be incorporated into the Executive Branch's for-
eign policy decision-making.
Congress, unfortunately, with its crowded agenda, can intervene only
sporadically to assure that human rights considerations are integrated
into U.S. policy. The history of successful Congressional oversight of
and impact on U.S. policies toward Haiti and the Philippines attests to
the difficulties involved. The complexities of the human rights issues
are themselves self-evident. The U.S. foreign policy process within and
between the Executive Branch and Congress often confounds and
defeats the well-intentioned pragmatist at either end of Pennsylvania
Avenue. In the case of Somalia, the Congress, after repeatedly prod-
ding the Executive Branch, helped create a more realistic foreign policy
that will further United States regional interests while simultaneously
122. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
123. See Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1988) (providing the stan-
dard for when the United States must refuse assistance to foreign countries).
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maintaining the United States' reputation as a nation capable of as-
suming a leadership role in promoting human rights.

